- Sethapong Pattaramekanon
Softening Stances or Status Quo? Japan’s New Foreign Minister and Sino-Japanese Relations
Following his party’s stronger-than-expected performance in the October 2021 general election, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (LDP) announced that he would leave most of his cabinet, which had only been in existence for less than a month, largely unshuffled. One notable change he made to his second cabinet was the decision to appoint Yoshimasa Hayashi to the post of Foreign Minister, a position Kishida once held. Although the appointment of Hayashi, who has been described by some in the media as “pro-China”, may appear to signal warmer relations with Japan’s neighbor and largest trading partner at first glance, it remains unlikely that this will portend a thawing of the increasingly chilly relationship between the two nations.
Despite only having been elected to his first term in Japan’s Lower House, Hayashi is no political neophyte. Like many Japanese lawmakers, he hails from a well-established political family, and his resume is nothing to scoff at either—he holds degrees from the University of Tokyo and Harvard University, has been serving in the House of Councillors for nearly three decades, and previously held various cabinet positions under three different prime ministers. With his extensive qualifications, Hayashi is often touted as a potential prime ministerial candidate in the future.
As Kishida’s second-in-command in the LDP’s moderate Kōchikai faction, Hayashi was in charge of both his successful campaign in the 2021 LDP leadership election to succeed the unpopular Yoshihide Suga, in addition to his unsuccessful initial bid for party leadership in the previous year, when Kishida was soundly defeated by Suga. The Kōchikai faction is generally seen as more dovish on foreign policy than Kishida’s predecessors Shinzo Abe and Suga, and its members are typically ambivalent on revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits Japan from maintaining an active military force. China has voiced its opposition to earlier attempts to reinterpret this article by the Japanese government, specifically in 2014 under the premiership of Abe.
Hayashi’s perceived pro-China tendencies have drawn some criticism from the party’s more conservative factions. Perhaps the most controversial of all was his former chairmanship of the Japan–China Friendship Parliamentarians' Union, a parliamentary group that advocates for friendlier ties with Beijing. Hayashi has since resigned as chairman of the group “to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings” after accepting his position as Foreign Minister under Kishida. Furthermore, while serving as Foreign Minister, Kishida himself had also expressed reluctance in revising Article 9; a position he appears to have since abandoned.
However, the fact that two prominent members of the Kōchikai are currently serving as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister respectively may not necessarily mean a softening stance towards China for Japan. During his LDP leadership campaign, Kishida seemingly pivoted to the right and adopted a more hawkish tone towards China, most likely to secure the support of conservative heavyweights within the party and allowing him to prevail over his liberal rival Taro Kono, who was initially seen as the favorite.
Following his election, Kishida has made a few moves that would assuredly provoke the ire of Beijing, such as the creation of a new “special adviser on human rights” post aimed at addressing human rights issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. His economic security minister has also floated closer business ties to Taiwan, yet another highly incendiary foreign policy issue that China has repeatedly declared a diplomatic red line. Over the past year, Kishida has expressed interest in bolstering Japan’s defenses by acquiring pre-emptive strike capabilities for its Self-Defense Forces, in a departure from his previously dovish leanings.
Adding further pessimism to hopes that Sino-Japanese relations would be revived under Hayashi, one only has to look at how China is currently being perceived by the Japanese society at large. In a survey released by the Pew Research Center last year, 86% of Japanese respondents indicated that they hold “unfavorable” views of China, of whom 52% had “very unfavorable” views.
With the Japanese electorate rapidly souring on China, it is not inconceivable that it would be strategically unwise for Kishida or Hayashi to adopt stances that may be perceived as “soft” against China’s growing economic and military clout in the region, an increasingly salient issue in Japanese politics. In the latest election, the right-wing populist Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party) swept 41 seats nationwide, mostly in its Osaka-area stronghold, to emerge as the third-largest party in the Lower House.
The JIP vocally supports revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and despite being in opposition, the party is already in talks with the ruling LDP-Kōmeitō coalition to push for parliamentary debate on the matter. Theoretically, in combination with the JIP, the ruling coalition currently has enough seats to garner the two-thirds of votes required to approve a constitutional referendum, although the Buddhist-aligned Kōmeitō may be less inclined to support revising Article 9 owing to its pacifist ideology.
However, these developments in Japanese politics do not necessarily mean that the Kishida government will be boldly pursuing anti-China policies in the near future. As China remains the most important trading partner for Japan, any reckless diplomatic maneuvers by Hayashi or Kishida would almost certainly not do any favors for Kishida in fulfilling another of his key campaign promises—to revitalize the long-stagnant economy, given that it is heavily dependent on exports to the Chinese market. Also, with the upper house elections scheduled for next year, Kishida would probably not want to rock the boat too hard with any potentially controversial moves that could adversely affect his party’s chances before the election.
In Hayashi’s first call to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, both of them agreed that the two neighbors should engage in a “constructive and stable” relationship with one another, even if his concerns regarding human rights issues in China and disputed territories in the East and South China Seas went unheeded. In face of increasingly difficult foreign policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, we should not be expecting any heavy-handed foreign policy moves from the mild-mannered Kishida, nor his new Foreign Minister Hayashi anytime soon. For now, it’s looking to be more of the same—meaning China and Japan are likely going to remain locked in a contentious relationship, characterized by cautious economic cooperation and a degree of mutual suspicion, at least for the foreseeable future.
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